Chapter 1: Understanding Hedonism

Moral philosophers are increasingly integrating findings from evolutionary biology into their frameworks.

Hedonism, in philosophical terms, is defined as the ethical stance asserting that pleasure—understood as the fulfillment of desires—is the highest good and the ultimate goal of human existence. Historically, two main branches of hedonistic thought emerged: the Cyrenaics and Epicureans from Hellenistic philosophy, and the Utilitarians from the 19th to 21st centuries.

The Cyrenaic school, founded by Aristippus of Cyrene (modern-day Libya), thrived briefly around 435 BCE. Notably, Aristippus was a disciple of Socrates, who was not aligned with hedonistic principles. The Cyrenaics posited that a fulfilling life is centered around immediate physical pleasures, largely dismissing both intellectual pleasures and those derived from past or future experiences. Thus, they held that pain is the sole form of evil.

On the other hand, the Epicureans adopted a more nuanced view. They prioritized moral and intellectual pleasures, particularly those shared with friends, while still acknowledging the value of simple physical joys like enjoying bread and cheese. Epicurus, born in 341 BCE, was particularly concerned with the detriments of pain, which he believed obstructed the ideal life characterized by mental tranquility (ataraxia). Despite this complexity, Epicureanism is still categorized as hedonistic, primarily because Epicurus equated the absence of pain with the greatest pleasure.

Utilitarianism in the 19th century drew from earlier Greco-Roman hedonistic thought and manifested in two key forms, which resonate today. Jeremy Bentham advocated for a universal hedonic calculus aimed at maximizing overall pleasure while minimizing pain for the majority. He articulated his principle of utility as follows:

"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do… By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question…" (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1780).

This shift marks a move from a focus on personal virtue to a broader social perspective, encompassing governmental actions.

John Stuart Mill, another pivotal figure in Utilitarianism, recognized a flaw in Bentham's approach that likely echoed Epicurus's criticism of Aristippus: an overemphasis on the quantity of pleasure might overshadow the importance of its quality. Mill famously differentiated between "higher" and "lower" pleasures, paralleling the distinctions between Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism:

"It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others." (Utilitarianism, 1863).

For a considerable time, I have believed that a fundamental issue exists within nearly all forms of hedonism: while it is evident that nature has equipped us with pleasures and pains as motivational tools, evolutionary biology suggests that these experiences cannot be deemed intrinsic or ultimate goods; they are merely instrumental.

From an evolutionary standpoint, for example, pain serves as a warning for potential injuries that could lead to disability or death if ignored. Pleasure encourages us to partake in essential activities, such as courtship and reproduction, which require significant investment of time and resources. Thus, it becomes clear that the ultimate goods established by nature for all living organisms are survival and reproduction.

Recently, philosophers have begun to adopt this evolutionary perspective. A noteworthy paper by Alycia LaGuardia-LoBianco and Paul Bloomfield, titled The Axiology of Pain and Pleasure, published in the Journal of Value Inquiry, explores these themes.

Axiology, defined as the study of value and valuation, asks what factors contribute to the intrinsic value of different states of affairs. All consequentialist theories commence with an axiology that delineates what is valuable or worthy of pursuit. The term itself derives from the Greek word axia, meaning "worth" or "value." Interestingly, the Stoics recognized that "externals"—elements not rooted in virtue—could possess axia, thus being classified as preferred or dispreferred.

The typical hedonistic axiological argument follows this line: "Pain is unpleasant, so it must be bad; pleasure is enjoyable, so it must be good." However, LaGuardia-LoBianco and Bloomfield argue that this reasoning is flawed: our feelings do not always serve as accurate indicators of truth.

To illustrate, consider a story recounted in an article I encountered, likely in the New York Times. A woman on a first date felt "butterflies" in her stomach, usually a sign of excitement, which led her to believe the date was going better than expected. However, she soon rushed to the restroom to vomit—she had food poisoning. This example emphasizes that feelings may not be reliable indicators of reality.

Returning to the hedonistic axiology, proponents like the Epicureans and Utilitarians might concede that pain can sometimes yield positive outcomes or that pleasure can lead to negative consequences. For instance, exercising may be painful but promotes long-term health benefits, while indulging in junk food may feel pleasurable at the moment but has adverse long-term effects. Nonetheless, hedonists maintain that pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure intrinsically good. In response, LaGuardia-LoBianco and Bloomfield propose:

"We motivate an error theory of the value of pain and pleasure according to which arguments for pain's intrinsic disvalue and pleasure's intrinsic value rest on a mistake. This mistake arises from the commonplace association between what is painful and what is bad."

They further assert:

"We argue that we should understand pain and pleasure through their role in evolution, as mechanisms which, when functioning properly, motivate us to avoid what is bad for us and do what is good for us… Given this evolutionary perspective, the value of pain and pleasure is always and purely instrumental."

Indeed, evolution plays a pivotal role! This perspective exemplifies how the sciences and humanities—specifically evolutionary biology and moral philosophy—can inform and enhance one another. Moral philosophy doesn't merely translate into biological terms; rather, each discipline sheds light on the other, leading to fresh and unexpected insights.

Interestingly, the ancient Stoics arrived at similar conclusions without any knowledge of evolution. They relied instead on a fundamental understanding of nature's workings. In Book III of Cicero's De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (translated as On the Ends of Good and Evil), Cato the Younger, a friend of Cicero, articulates the Stoic perspective. He contrasts it with Epicureanism through the so-called "cradle argument," stating in part:

"It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth… a living creature feels an attachment for itself, an impulse to preserve itself… But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action." (III.5)

This insight is profound: humans are endowed by nature (or evolution, as we would say) with an instinct for self-preservation. Pain and pleasure serve merely as signposts guiding our actions. We may instinctively endure discomfort or evade pleasure if it threatens our survival. Thus, virtue—reasoned, cooperative behavior—becomes an essential strategy for survival and, under favorable conditions, for flourishing.

While LaGuardia-LoBianco and Bloomfield take a measured approach in critiquing hedonism from an evolutionary standpoint, suggesting their objections do not entirely dismiss hedonistic theories, I believe they stop short. They contend:

"[The hedonists'] axiology of pain and pleasure's values need refinement: what ought to be maximized are not pleasures per se, nor ought pains per se to be minimized, but rather good pleasures alone are maximized while bad pains alone are minimized."

However, once we introduce the concepts of "bad" pains and "good" pleasures, hedonism lacks a coherent framework for distinguishing between different types of pleasures and pains without ultimately renouncing its core tenets.

The first video titled "Epicurus | Practical Reasoning about Pain and Pleasure | Philosophy Core Concepts" discusses Epicurus's thoughts on how pleasure and pain inform ethical decision-making, offering insights into the relevance of his philosophy today.

The second video titled "Epictetus, Discourses | Criticisms of Epicureanism | Philosophy Core Concepts" examines Epictetus's critiques of Epicurean thought, providing a deeper understanding of Stoic philosophy and its response to hedonism.