Exploring the Subjectivity of Scientific Evidence in Philosophy
Written on
Chapter 1: The Role of Interpretation in Scientific Evidence
Scientific evidence is often thought to be objective, yet it requires interpretation to be meaningful.
“If all the evidence in the universe turned in favour of creationism, I would be the first to admit it, and I would immediately change my mind. As things stand, however, all available evidence (and there is a vast amount of it) favours evolution.” — Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion
Richard Dawkins, a well-known atheist, emphasizes the importance of scientific evidence and encourages individuals, especially children, to critically evaluate it. Many of us share a perspective similar to Dawkins, distinguishing between facts and values, evidence and doctrine, reason and belief. Science has a long-standing reputation for being "objective," allowing rational individuals to assess facts and derive scientific conclusions.
Section 1.1: The Foundation of Evidence
Scientific inquiry seeks to offer "evidence" for claims about the natural world. For instance, if I assert, "The car is moving very fast," you might ask, "What evidence supports that claim?" I would respond, "The car is traveling at 200 km/h (~120 mps)." You would likely agree that this indicates the car is indeed moving quickly. Scientists would categorize "200 km/h" as neutral and value-free evidence for my assertion.
However, to accept "200 km/h" as valid evidence for the claim, we must both adhere to a shared framework of interpretation—specifically, how we understand speed. If we need to interpret an observation for it to qualify as "evidence," it inherently carries some level of subjectivity and bias.
A theory of interpretation—hermeneutics—precedes our understanding of evidence. The interpreted observation "The car is moving at 120 km/h" is considered theory-laden or value-laden. This article aims to illustrate that hermeneutics are fundamental to interpreting evidence.
Subsection 1.1.1: Evidence vs. Reporting
If evidence were merely a report of raw facts, it would seldom be regarded as "evidence." Scientific observations involve translations, converting observations into facts and subsequently into conclusions. Both processes hinge on prior commitments to interpretative theories.
Consider measuring the length of two objects, A and B. If you place them side by side, comparing their lengths is straightforward. However, if they are separated, you'll need a ruler to measure. Suppose you measure A at 5 cm and B at 7 cm, presenting these measurements as evidence to conclude that "B is longer than A."
Now, what makes this evidence theory-laden?
First, when using a ruler, you must begin measuring from the 0 cm mark. Starting from any point before 0 cm would produce an incorrect measurement. You also need to know how to read the markings. If the object starts at 0 and ends at 7, it measures 7 cm. Proper ruler usage relies on an implicit "theory of rulers," which requires instruction. A child given a ruler without guidance may not understand how to use it effectively.
Similarly, if handed a spectrometer without an explanation, one would be lost.
Second, when you state "A is 5 cm," you assume the listener understands the "theory of rulers" and "centimeters." If someone claims "A is 5 berries" and "B is 7 avocados," the communication becomes unintelligible. Our understanding of measurement systems dictates our observations and interpretations.
Thus, evidence is theory-laden in two respects: it necessitates a methodology (how to use a ruler) and a shared understanding of value (that "cm" is a standard length measurement).
Chapter 2: The Influence of Paradigms on Interpretation
The first video, "Should Christians Be Concerned By Ape-Men?" explores the nuances of interpreting evidence in the context of creationism versus evolution.
Philosopher Pierre Duhem, in The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, stated that using scientific instruments requires substituting concrete objects with abstract representations, which are then subjected to theoretical reasoning.
The commitment to a particular interpretation of evidence is crucial. Dawkins argues that examining the evidence for evolution should lead to its acceptance over creationism. However, philosophers of science like Kuhn and Feyerabend contend that interpreting evidence as supporting evolution necessitates already embracing the principles of evolutionary theory.
To interpret observations—like measuring lengths—one must subscribe to the theories of length measurement and the meaning of units. For example, to view embryology as evidence for evolution, one must already accept the relevant theories in embryology and their implications.
But where do these interpretative frameworks arise? According to Kuhn, the interpretation of facts is bound by a "paradigm," which dictates how a scientific community processes observations. A paradigm functions like a dictionary, shaping our understanding of the world.
Kuhn illustrates this by referencing the Copernican Revolution. Before Copernicus and Galileo's advocacy for a heliocentric model, the geocentric theory by Ptolemy prevailed. Both astronomers observed the same celestial phenomena yet interpreted them through distinct paradigms, leading to varied conclusions about "evidence."
While modern perspectives often dismiss Ptolemy’s model, it was more accurate than Copernicus’s initial proposals. It was only with Galileo’s telescope that the scientific community shifted its allegiance.
Section 2.1: The Subjectivity of Evidence Interpretation
Evidence is never devoid of interpretation. When Dawkins invites us to "examine the evidence," he implies that we must also interpret it. Yet, how can we assert that carbon dating indicates the Earth is over 4 billion years old without understanding the underlying principles of the method?
We must grant authority to scientific methods, and if Kuhn and his contemporaries are correct, such authority isn't inherently justified by evidence. Ultimately, science delineates what facts and observations we should consider as evidence, as well as those we should disregard.
Conclusion: The Intersection of Values and Science
Sam Harris, during a debate with William Craig, stated:
“… if someone doesn’t value evidence, what evidence are you going to provide to prove that they should value it? If someone doesn’t value logic, what logical argument could you provide to show the importance of logic?”
It was commonly believed that science solely deals with "facts" and has no stake in "values." However, a deeper analysis reveals that a commitment to science inherently involves a set of values. This notion is often overlooked in education and discussions surrounding science and religion.
Recognizing this relationship brings us closer to understanding that the descriptive "is" may also imply prescriptive "ought."
This article builds on my previous discussion regarding the naturalistic fallacy.
What Is The Naturalistic Fallacy?
The Open-Question Argument: “is” can’t imply “ought”
The second video, "Bernardo Kastrup - The True Nature of Reality," delves into the philosophical implications of our interpretations of evidence and reality.